









Negative Duties, the WTO and the Harm Argument


One of the essential questions in the ethics of development is who, if anybody, should shoulder the burden of alleviating worldwide poverty. One of the most forceful answers to date is that citizens in rich countries should shoulder the burden because they are to blame for the plight of the poor. Western nations dominate the global institutional order and as a result their citizens share responsibility for its negative consequences.​[1]​ These nations have been instrumental in setting up a system of rules that regulate global trade, investment, and the allocation of property entitlements. Those rules profoundly shape the fate of people living in poor states, and contribute to the perpetuation of poverty and misery in their lives:

There are many ways in which it is clear that the rich have harmed the poor. Ale Nodye knows about one of them. He grew up in a village by the sea, in Senegal, in West Africa. […] The fish stock from which Nodye’s father and grandfather took their catch and fed their families have been destroyed by industrial fishing fleets that come from Europe, China and Russia and sell their fish to well-fed Europeans who can afford to pay higher prices (Singer 2010, pp.29–30). 

The repression of the citizens of Equatorial Guinea, and the denial to them of the revenues from the country’s oil deposits, may strike outsiders as a cause for sympathy. […] This natural course of thinking about the situation in Equatorial Guinea overlooks a morally significant fact. Outsiders to Equatorial Guinea are already doing a great deal with regard to its citizens: outsiders are making their plight worse (Wenar 2008, pp.7–8).

I am arguing that the citizens and governments of the wealthy countries, by imposing the present global economic order, significantly contribute to the persistence of severe poverty and thus share institutional moral responsibility for it (T. W. Pogge 2008, p.121).

These claims are not entirely new. Indeed, in international relations theory they have been advanced by a number of theorists with different theoretical perspectives. Realists have long maintained that international institutions mainly exist as a smokescreen for the interests of the economic and military powers.​[2]​ The strong do what they will, and the weak suffer what they must (Rex et al. 1954, p.402; Mearsheimer 2003, p.55).​[3]​ Marxist and post-colonial thinkers have interpreted international politics through the lens of class conflicts that pitted the capitalist, industrialized nations of the north against the agrarian, underdeveloped countries of the south (Gramsci & Hoare 1971; Wallerstein 1979). For instance, dependency theory, a spin-off from Marxism, argued that the quest for the economic expansion of advanced economies drains away resources from poor countries (Prebisch 1950; Baran 1957). While the former develop further, the latter succumb to economic depression and deeper poverty. For the realist, there is no solution to this self-help system in which the powerful get their way, short of a full-blown global leviathan to keep conflicting interests and displays of naked power in check. For the Marxist, the solution lies in transforming the capitalist mode of economic production into an economic system in which ownership of the means of production is more widely distributed, thus subverting the primary rationale for the exploitation of the poor by the rich.
In contrast to these international relations scholars, political philosophers have mounted a novel effort. They start from a moral premise that everyone shares, namely the negative duty not to harm. Although the ‘harm argument’ takes various forms, its proponents share the claim that existing global practices are deeply implicated in causing harm and injustice, and that therefore the citizens of western nations that create and sanction these practices are responsible for compensating for this harm those affected by poverty. 
This charge of blameworthiness has extensive implications for poverty alleviation programs, for institutional reform at the international level, and even for domestic politics by possibly altering the distributional balance within countries. More specifically, many of the examples provided in support of the institutional harm argument make a compelling case that the patterns of interactions among countries require substantial changes in order to rectify the negative consequences the global institutional scheme has on the disadvantaged. However, the baseline for harm offered by such views is incomplete, and this fact weakens our ability to pass judgment on the liability of Western nations. In particular, when we specify with more precision what a negative duty not to harm entails, the relevance of the actions of Western states for their responsibility for poverty alleviation diminishes significantly.
The main aim of this paper is to clarify the standard for evaluating claims of harm. Once we apply this standard we can see that many of the examples discussed, instead of representing cases of harms caused, are rather instances of benefits withheld from the poor. A moral case can be made that benefits should be extended by the rich countries toward poor ones, but this case will look very different than a case for responsibility for harm. This is not to deny that people living in affluent countries harm the poor and share moral responsibility for it. It is only to say the examples offered do not support the case for responsibility for harm on which it proponents want to rest arguments for redistribution across borders.  
Section 1. Negative Duties and Harm
	The harm argument relies on a distinction between actively causing harm and refraining from helping, or between negative duties and positive ones.​[4]​ Attributions of moral responsibility on this account involve showing that the citizens in rich nations are actively causing poverty. The harm argument therefore does not rely, as the initial arguments in the global justice debate did, on the idea that the rich have the obligation to help the poor because they can afford it (Singer 1972; Beitz 2000). Rather the rich have acquired obligations because they share causal responsibility for creating global poverty. Therefore, to have a conception of poverty as harm, is to regard poverty as the failure of a negative duty not to cause harm, rather than of a positive duty to aid those in need.  
The harm argument does not distinguish properly between harms that result as a feature of regular interactions between people, meaning harms that are typically not blameworthy, from undue harms. When country A attacks country B, kills its civilians and depletes its economic resources in an unjust and prolonged war, country A is responsible for the deaths as well as for the economic poverty that ensues as a result of the conflict. This is a paradigmatic case of undue harm, as are colonialism, genocide, displacement, slavery, unjust imprisonment. However, when country A refuses to trade with country B, or trade on terms that country B prefers, or when its fishing vessels deplete the fishing supplies of international waters that abut the territorial waters of country B, the case for responsibility for harm is much less clear. Indeed, as I will argue in the next section, once we clarify what undue harm entails, some of these cases clearly do not qualify as examples of undue harm, and do not entail obligations for reparations. Many of the negative consequences resulting from interactions at the global level are the result of benefits that could be granted to poor countries to enhance their economic wellbeing, or the result of the primitive and incomplete norms which prevents the developing world from benefiting as much as they could from global resources and international trade.
For example, Thomas Pogge (2008, p.18) argues that WTO regime harms the poor because it ‘opens our markets too little’ and its ‘rules [are] designed to facilitate global monopolies.’ Furthermore, agreements such as TRIPS (the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights) have led to the deaths of many poor people who could have otherwise survived, because it denied the sick in underdeveloped countries access to cheap medicine (T. W. Pogge 2008, p.22). These and other rules of the WTO, imposed by the rich countries on the poor, result in harm and therefore the rich ‘bear then a collective responsibility for their governments’ role in designing and imposing this global order and for their governments’ failure to reform it toward greater human rights fulfillment’ (T. W. Pogge 2008, pp.178–179). Likewise, Loren Lomasky supports a non-institutionalist version of the harm argument, even though he does not implicate the WTO. Lomasky (2007, p.215) argues that ‘there is quite enough blame to go around, including blame ascribable to wealthy countries for committing injustices against their own citizens which simultaneously visit hardships on those in other countries who are least able to cope.’ Protectionist measures adopted by rich countries perpetrate injustice against the latter, by depriving them of access to large markets and by distorting their own markets and productions processes (Lomasky 2007, pp.223–224). 
They both resort to the vocabulary of rights violations to refer to the harms inflicted by the global economic order. Lomasky says that ‘to be blocked from buying and selling across borders is an unjustifiable restraint on liberty,’ meaning that it is a violations of the liberal right of freedom of contract for both domestic traders as well as foreign ones (Lomasky 2007, p.226). Pogge makes a more general point. The global economic order is harmful because ‘it fails to realize human rights insofar as it is reasonably possible’ (T. W. Pogge 2008, p.25). The evidence for violations of human rights by the WTO and other international institutions is provided by figures showing the extent of absolute poverty, the extent of inequality, and the trend of the first two factors (T. W. Pogge 2008, p.102). 
The evidence of violations of human rights goes beyond the WTO. Leif Wenar (2008, p.2) maintains that a significant portion of international trade is based on stolen goods. Therefore, ‘the plainest criticism of global commerce today is not that it violates some abstract distributive standard, but that it violates property rights.’ Our consumption of natural resources is based on acquisitions from repressive, dictatorial countries. For example, Nigeria has witnessed a long train of authoritarian rulers who acquired power unlawfully via military coups and used their position as representatives of the Nigerian state to trade its oil abroad for revenue. The rulers have used this revenue to buttress their power and to further oppress a population that is already in dire need (Wenar 2008, pp.5–6). That Western countries recognize as legitimate any group with a monopoly on political power in a country, regardless of whether it has acquired the power lawfully or not, means that they agree to trade in stolen goods. Their actions contributes to dispossessing the local population, gives tyrannical governments the means to further violate the rights of its poor citizens, and creates incentives for others to stage military coups in order to become the beneficiaries of the resource privilege. 
Therefore, the harm argument as an institutional thesis requires building from contemporary examples a causal structural explanation about the ill effects of the global institutional order as a whole. The resource and borrowing privileges are the result of regulatory norms embodied in international treaties, which are generated by the representatives of the powerful western nations and meant to protect their interests at the expense of everybody else. 
Yet one reasonable objection to this way of casting the failings of the global institutional order is that the causes of poverty are mainly local. Its defenders point out that there is significant national-level variation in the levels of economic growth and economic well-being among the developing nations, which cannot be explained if the global order is the main causal determinant of poverty. Corruption, self-serving elites, misguided economic policies, and inadequate domestic institutional capacities are more likely to determine poverty in the developing world than inadequate global rules. In the Law of Peoples, Rawls (2001, p.77) claimed that in societies that are poor, ‘the problem is commonly the nature of the public political culture and the religious and philosophical traditions that underlie its institutions. The great social evils in poorer societies are likely to be oppressive governments and corrupt elites.’ 
Lomasky agrees. Thus he significantly departs from the other defenders of the harm argument when he sides with those who claim that the causes of poverty are mostly local (Lomasky 2007, pp.215–216, 218). But Pogge (2008, p.146) tenaciously resists this empirical characterization that he labels ‘explanatory nationalism.’ He is concerned that the view is misleading and it leads to a moral error in properly apportioning moral responsibilities. As citizens living in rich countries, who in turn uphold the regulatory norms and international institutions, ‘we are deeply implicated in these harms,’ Pogge (2008, p.148) insists. Pogge does not deny that local causes have real effects on poverty, and indeed he cannot.  As Mathias Risse (2005) has shown, there is a wealth of economic research which supports explanatory nationalism. Rather, Pogge maintains that there are substantive global causes in addition to the local ones (T. W. Pogge 2008, p.17; T. W. Pogge 2004, p.263). 
Articulated in these general terms, the argument needs to be supplemented with a more precise account of the causal effects of the global institutional order and of the baseline for judging harm. The problems that defenders of the harm argument identify are often the result of imprecise, weak or inexistent global rules, and some of the examples of harm are cases of failures of positive duties to help rather than negative duties not to harm. The next section provides a methodology for assessing charges of undue harm. Then I focus on the examples involving the WTO to show why those charges leveled against the western world are, at least based on the evidence supplied so far, hard to sustain.

Section 2. Some Methodological Suggestions 
Those working in the tradition inspired by John Stuart Mill’s Harm Principle notoriously struggled with the challenge of specifying what kinds of actions constitute instances of undue moral harm. Since ‘virtually every kind of human conduct can affect the interests of others for better or worse to some degree,’ we need a notion of harm that distinguishes types of harm that are the appropriate subject of social regulation from those that are not (Feinberg 1987, p.12). The harm principle is too vague to be of any use because one can cause harm without being as a result either morally or legally responsible for it.  Competition between two potential employees for a job results in someone losing the competition, and therefore being harmed; however the winner is not morally responsible for the harm. Such situations are not ordinarily considered appropriate for attribution of moral blame. 
In his influential book Harm to Others, Joel Feinberg’s distinguishes several relevant classes of harm. The most plausible candidate for considering an act harmful is if it constitutes a setback to interests. Interests are stakes people have in certain activities or states of affairs. Some interests are inconsequential, while other interests are very important. The most important are the ‘distinguishable components of a person’s wellbeing,’ such a physical security, nourishment, health, and resources to pursue one’s goals (Feinberg 1987, p.34). These are what Feinberg calls welfare interests. Yet not all invasions of a person’s welfare interests should be considered morally problematic harms. Many classes of interest should be excluded, such as those that the victim has consented to by making risky bets which set back one’s financial interest. The same is true of harms that result from fair competition (two businesses that vie for the same customers). Such competitions result in setback to substantive interests, but they do not produce the kinds of harm that we think should induce moral liability in the winner because they take place as part of a general practice that is conducive to the well-being of each.
Welfare interests are typically safeguarded by specifying a set of rights attached to them. Feinberg (1987, pp.34, 42) thinks the only way to make sense of harm is if it is a violation of a right. Feinberg was primarily concerned with setting the boundaries of public criminal law, but his insights are of wider import. Following Feinberg, we can say that moral harm is the invasion of a morally protected interest or moral right. Causing physical injury, coercively depriving someone of food, and stealing money are all instances of moral, and in most places, legal harms. The identity of the agents committing these harms is irrelevant. They can be individuals, corporate agents, political institutions and so on. 
There are at least two more issues a theory that provides an account of harm has to grapple with.  The first, I have argued, is to lay down a view of morally important entitlements, or rights, whose violation counts as an instance of undue moral harm.  The second is to notice is that for a certain class of issues, there is no standard of moral harm prior to a positive convention, such as a law, that establishes a benchmark against which harmful actions are judged and responsibility is assigned. The notion of harm as a violation of moral or legal rights does not offer clear guidance in cases where an activity has a tendency to cause harm to certain people, but prohibiting it causes harm to the people who have an interest in engaging in it. Pollution is a case in point. A moral interest in human health must be balanced against the interests people have in driving cars, in generating electricity or in the production of goods that come from heavy industry. Attributing moral blame in this case involves judging the relative importance of conflicting interests. 
Where this happens, ‘no prior standard of wrongness exists’ (Feinberg 1987, p.230). The standard for imputing harm is created by the law or a regulatory agency that allocates permissions and restrictions to engage in certain activities, such as industrial pollution permits or limits for pollutants in car exhaust fumes.  In this instance, the harm principle does not offer any guidance for attributions of moral blame, or for designing policy, except to legitimate efforts to restrict activities that have complex effects and to create standards for wrongdoing. Cases when individuals acting separately do no harm, but the aggregate effect of their action tends to cause harm over time, are appropriate for such balancing of interests. They characterize the typical scenario for tragedy of the commons problems. Farmers who gradually increase their using of a common pasture do not act wrongly. However, the potential for overgrazing and making everyone worse off calls for regulating the use of the pasture, and assigning permissions and restrictions for the number of cattle that each farmer can have. Prior to setting up those restrictions, the farmers are not however morally liable for harm.
Third, attributions of moral responsibility should also be concerned with indentifying the strength of the causal connections between the agents. When we move from persons to institutions as the agents of harm, assigning responsibility is complicated by the fact that institutional agents are typically part of longer causal chains. Intuitively, we want to say that being part of a causal chain that triggers a harmful chain of events weakens moral responsibility the further along the chain the agent is located. One could be very much removed from the proximate source of harm and contribute to it in a most inconsequential way. Therefore, a crucial additional condition is that the wrongdoing must be a genuine causal contributor, or a proximate cause (Feinberg 1987, p.119). Because our actions have many effects on others, some of which we cannot control or foresee down a long chain of interactions, we need to know more precisely the place in the causal structure of an action before we can make sense of moral responsibility for the outcomes of that action. 
What are the lessons of this analysis for judging the harms caused by some countries in their dealings with other countries? First, the best way to conceive of negative duties not to harm is to think of them as obligations not to violate moral rights. Second, clarifying people’s moral  rights involves at times creating positive rules that balance conflicting interests where no prior standard of harm exists. Third, assigning blame requires making the causal connections transparent. At the very least, those who offer the institutional harm argument would have to supplement their account with a distinctive list of interests-as-rights whose violations would counts as harms and of types of actions international institutions engage in that would be rights violating. Judged against this baseline, the harm argument is ambiguous and does not offer good guidance for attributing moral blame to the appropriate agents.
These suggestions drawn partially from Feinberg’s extensive analysis of harm are not the only way to assemble standards for judging institutional responsibilities for harm, and there may be more comprehensive alternative accounts that can serve this purpose. Nonetheless, I think they represent a plausible mapping of the most important dimensions of evaluating allegations for moral harm. Without offering a defense for this particular set of methodological suggestions here, I will apply these standards to evaluate allegations of moral harm committed by international institutions that generate responsibilities to alleviate poverty next. 
Section 3. WTO and the Problem of Undue Harm
One of the essential sticking points of the harm argument is that the rules of international trade are harmful. This is paradoxical, given that the WTO is often hailed as an exemplar of a successful international institution (Goldstein et al. 2007, p.38; Barton et al. 2008, p.205). And in some ways it is. The purpose of the WTO, formerly known as GATT, is to reduce trade barriers that countries impose on one another. Recognizing that the trade barriers are detrimental to economic growth and prosperity in general, countries have come together after WWII to overcome a collective action problem and negotiate multilateral reductions in trade barriers. For instance, a recent study found that GATT/WTO increased trade by 43% for pairs of participants in the organization, compared to pairs of non-participants over the duration of the regime, with the strongest benefits of an average increase of 136% accruing after the first two years of GATT and of and 93% after the Torquay round (1950-1951) respectively (Goldstein et al. 2007, pp.55–56). Moreover, trade increased for both industrial and nonindustrial countries, although at different rates (Goldstein et al. 2007, p.56). This evidence shows that the WTO is moving in the right direction at a good pace. The statistics point to a great positive role for the WTO, and this result, by Pogge’s own support of the benefits of free trade for poor countries, should be celebrated. 
To say that the WTO harms the poor is to fail to disaggregate the effects of the actions of individual states from those of the organization that now they are a part of. If moral responsibility for tariffs and subsidies accrues at all, it accrues to individual countries, and it accrues differentially, based on their different degrees of protectionism. It is not a responsibility that the WTO acquires, because the WTO’s raison d’être is precisely to reduce the barriers to trade and therefore reduce their negative effects. The institution is acting to mitigate and eliminate the harmful effects that the actions of their individual members acting independently produce, just as laws that prohibit racial discrimination seek to mitigate and eliminate the harmful effects of racism that accompany the interactions of individuals acting on their own.
	This is why Pogge’s response to objections that highlight the positive effects of the WTO is inadequate. Pogge says that one may well believe that the WTO is overall improving the situation of the global poor, but ‘improving,’ Pogge argues, simply means harming them less. Imagine a man that beats members of his family less often than he previously did. He is not ‘improving’ the situation of his family but rather abusing them less (T. W. Pogge 2008, p.23). Even if the WTO has produced lower overall levels of poverty, it still harms the poor, but at a declining rate (T. W. Pogge 2008, p.23). But the abusive father simply offers the wrong analogy, because it suggests that the wrongdoing and the correcting behavior stem from the same agent. This is however not the case of the WTO. Trade barriers are the result of states acting independently. The WTO tries to move states to act in the opposite direction, by creating the framework in which they can commit to reducing those barriers.  
	If the harm argument fails to establish the responsibility of the WTO, it does not mean that developed countries are off the hook. As long as they maintain tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade, they harm developing countries because the barriers restrict their access to large markets. Farm subsidies in the US and the EU, tariffs on agricultural products and quantitative restriction on imports are all hurting producers in the developing world by denying them the ability to sell their products on western markets. We can agree that these barriers harm the poor. But is this a case of undue harm?
Pogge would like to argue that it is. Pogge seeks to cast the effects of the trade barriers on people in underdeveloped countries as violations of human rights. Elaborating, Pogge says that extensive and severe poverty shows the global economic order to be engaged in rights violations (T. W. Pogge 2008, p.102). The moral assessment of an institutional structure has to be responsive to information about three factors, he says: the extent of absolute poverty, the extent of inequality, and the trend of the first two factors (T. W. Pogge 2008, p.102). The second, the extent of inequality, is a measure of relative poverty, and is a rough measure of the avoidability of poverty and the opportunity costs to the privileged of its avoidance. 
This strategy of invoking rights seems appropriate, but there are several problems with Pogge’s way of articulating what counts as a human rights violation. Is there a moral right not to be poor? If there is, what kinds of actions in which people engage would constitute violations of this moral right? The first is a difficult question, unlikely to be settled here. Let us assume however that such a right is defensible. The first thing to note is that it simply does not follow from the fact that people are poor that somebody has violated their rights. People can be poor because of natural disaster, or because the economic system they live under is corrupt and underperforming. We can call these situations unfortunate, because people have been made or kept poor as a result, but we would not think of describing it, or at least it would be a stretch in ordinary moral language to describe it as a situation where rights have been violated. These two examples are meant to invoke the intuition that rights violations require human agency.  There being a situation of poverty does not prove that acts that violate people’s rights have occurred. 
	Pogge anticipates this interpretation and says that the moral quality of an institutional order in which starvation occurs depends on whether and how that order is causally related to this starvation. It depends, that is, on the extent to which starvation could be avoided through institutional modification (T. W. Pogge 2008, p.116). But this is confusing. The fact that poverty could be avoided through the efforts of the rich does not show that the rich have caused it. Were I to be starving, the fact that someone could make me less hungry by providing me with food does not show that person to have caused my starvation. 
Therefore, an institution or institutional system failing to realize human rights ‘insofar as it is reasonably possible’ cannot be explained in terms of violations of clearly assignable moral entitlements. The three types of data that feed information for moral evaluations – absolute poverty, relative poverty and their trend cannot count as relevant data on their own, unless they result from violations of negative duties. Recall that Pogge employs inequality as a measure of the avoidability of poverty and the opportunity costs to the rich for its avoidance. But the question of whether the rich are responsible for the plight of the poor is distinct from the question of how the rich can alleviate poverty and what the costs of doing so are. The extent of inequality and of the opportunity costs for the rich for improving the condition of the poor, barring other information about the causal chain that produce the disparities, can only serve as benchmarks for assigning moral responsibility if one takes positive duties as dispositive, but not if one assumes, as the harm argument does, negative duties as a starting point.
Trade barriers are offered as a more specific example of rights violations. Yet they are not. Even if producers in developing countries could be made better off by more open trade, and therefore spread the wealth in their own societies, this example still does not count as a relevant kind of harm. The refusal to trade with someone, or trade on terms that are more favorable to them, is not a human rights violation. This is true even if the refusal to trade has negative consequences. Indeed, economists argue that trade barriers are detrimental all around; both for the people who would like to sell on western markets, and also for the producers and consumers in the western markets themselves. Subsidies create barriers to entry for new local producers just as they would for foreign producers, and the higher prices that result from trade tariffs and import quotas hurt local consumers by keeping prices artificially high. Trade barriers are detrimental not just for those who would like to export, but counterproductive for creating a domestic competitive market as well. 
Still, the fact that trade barriers are misguided, does not show that a violation of rights has taken place.​[5]​ It may be callous not to lift restrictions on trade, but it is not a violation of the global poor’s rights if rich nations fail to do so. Bad consequences are not evidence of violations of rights, even if consequences should matter in judging the relative acceptability of a system of rights in general, as Amartya Sen argues (Sen 1988). The example of trade barriers does not support the case that international institutions facilitate harms that violate human rights.
Of course, Pogge has argued elsewhere (2007) that ‘a right not to be hungry’ or ‘a right not to be poor’ creates substantive demands on others. Insofar as a right not to be poor is a claim right, that is a right that generates positive obligations in others to help, it can be justified even absent any evidence of a direct connection between the actions of those obligated to relief poverty and those who find themselves poor. But this justification would entail a positive duty to help (Patten 2005, p.27). Without providing an explicit connection between the harming rich and the global poor, Pogge is in danger of being caught up in a slippage between his strong initial commitment to negative duties and positive duties to help those in need.​[6]​ 
Consequently, one needs to say more about the place of human agency in causing a setback to interests in not being poor in order to provide evidence a failure of negative duties not to harm. Other examples show that the actions of the rich make the poor worse off without harming them in the relevant sense. Peter Singer (2010, pp.29–30) discusses industrial fishing in international waters off the coast of Senegal, which has depleted the fish stock and left the fishermen unable to earn their living and survive. This is, indeed a terrible outcome. It is also a classic tragedy of the commons problem, in which ocean resources are held in common by everyone, without any restriction on how much of those resources anyone can legitimately use for their own benefit. And although overfishing has indeed led over time to an aggregate harm, and therefore it needs to be urgently addressed, the individual vessels or fishermen who continued to fish did not do anything inherently wrong or rights violating. Reversing overfishing requires a system of entitlements and restrictions in place in which the severe consequences for the Senegalese fishermen are made prominent. This system would however have to balance the interest of the Senegalese fishermen with the general interests of others in using ocean resources.
A similar objection can be raised against the TRIPS example. Pogge has worked more than any other political philosopher to convincingly argue that international agreements that codify intellectual property rights in drugs offer protections for the interests of drug manufactures that are too extensive. TRIPs (the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights), was created during the Uruguay Round 1986-1994. This agreement has cemented among other things a patent protection for the producers of life-saving drugs lasting twenty years, for the duration of which generic drug manufacturers are excluded from producing the same drugs. This means that generic drug manufacturers cannot sell medicine to patients who cannot afford the more expensive, patent-protected version (T. W. Pogge 2008, p.231). Millions of avoidable deaths happen because of these patent protections. Pogge argues persuasively that the consequences of a system of property should be taken into account when designing the fundamental rules of the property regime. This includes, among other things, the incentives for innovations, whether and to what extent first producers are entitled to protection for their creation, and the effects on the fundamental interests of others in getting access to life-saving medicine. Taking into account all of these factors, there is a strong case to be made that 20 years in patent protections for the pharmaceutical companies who spearhead innovation is too long. 
Despite this legitimate concern with the bad effects of TRIPS, these effects are not evidence of undue harm. Legally defined intellectual property rights offer, like fishing or pollution permits, standards for wrong action where none existed before. They are a special, relatively new, hotly contested category of legal rights that seek to strike a precarious balance between acknowledging the efforts of those who invest resources in new ideas and allowing them to benefit from them on the one hand, and the interest of others in benefiting from those discoveries once they are made on the other hand. Focusing on actual or potential harms alone does not offer a good guidance about how best to strike that balance, and in practice laws and treaties can strike it in the wrong place. TRIPS may well be such a case, as I believe it is. But this is not evidence of violation of the rights of the poor, because prior to the law allocating the right to manufacture and to access the drugs, the poor had no entitlement to them. This is not to deny that undue harms are being perpetrated on the poor by western rich nations. It is only to suggest that harm argument in its present form does not support the charge that violations of negative duties have occurred. And rather than being the result of exploitative regulatory norms, the harm is often the result of primitive or inexistent international norms. This is not just a difference in emphasis, but a significant one, that more accurately isolates one of the causes of the global suffering. More on this next.
Section 4. The Limits of the Existing Global Order
Despite important positive effects over time, the WTO suffers from severe disabilities as an international organization. The utter failure of the latest negotiation round, called the Doha round, launched in 2001, is a telling symptom. The WTO relies on a primitive organizational structure and archaic rules such as the consensus of all of its 153 members for its legislative decision-making (Narlikar 2005). It has inherited its organizational structure from GATT, which at its creation in 1948 was intended primarily as a bargaining vehicle among a small number of industrialized countries (Barton et al. 2008, pp.38, 48). Instead of a substantive reform of its rules and practices needed to adapt to its much larger membership and the wider diversity of interested represented among its members, the transition from GATT to the WTO in 1995 kept intact for the most part much of the same institutional design (Barton et al. 2008, p.208). And despite having formalized some rules about negotiations and treaty making during this transition, much of the negotiation process is still informal and opaque, and the developed countries continue to dominate agenda-setting. This fact raises valid concerns about fairness within the trade regime and its effects on different constituencies. And the practical downsides are obvious. The disagreement of member countries over the agenda, concessions to developing countries, and the demand for a greater formalization, transparency and access for the legislative process have brought the institution to a standstill after Doha (Narlikar 2005). And while the different features of the WTO institutional design have made it more difficult for the voice of the countries with a smaller share of the global trade to be effective, these features are disadvantageous across the board because they make it almost impossible to get agreements anymore. The problem with the WTO is that it is an agent that is captive to poor institutional design choices that negatively affects the ability of all of its members to advance their goals in a mutually beneficial manner.
Consequently, the harm argument attributes too much agency to the different components of the global institutional order. Many of the harms its proponents discuss are the result of a young, immature institutional order, in which rules have unintended side effects, good rules are not properly enforced, and clear rules are simply lacking. Take for instance the claim that the global property regime that sanctions the resource privilege and the borrowing privilege by its very nature harms the poor. What Wenar, Pogge and Singer call the ‘property regime’ is the result of a strong and unqualified norm of state sovereignty.  The norm of state sovereignty protects morally important interests, such as self-determination, immunity against unjustified military interventions, and formal equality for states in international agreements.  And while justified, one of effects of this norm, at least under the current interpretation favored by international law, is that the property regime within the state is a purely internal matter, and that self-serving political elites will manipulate internal autonomy to gain control over resources, thereby causing harms to the populations of those states. The international ‘property regime’ is not the result of property rules that favor the interest of the rich but rather the consequence of a poorly circumscribed norm defending state sovereignty. 
Wenar says that when western countries and private companies deal with dictators in poor countries, their actions are akin to buying stolen goods. Similarly, Singer claims that the international legal and political order recognizes the western countries as the rightful possessor of those goods, when instead they should be branded as criminals (Singer 2010, p.31). However, there is a crucial difference between knowingly buying stolen goods in normal (domestic) circumstances and trading with dictators. In domestic cases individuals trade in a context in which property entitlements are clear and relatively easy to ascertain. This is not the case in international trade. Within any country, whether resources are owned and managed privately or publicly, and who is entitled to trade them abroad is not settled by international rules but by domestic ones, and western partners acquire rights of ownership without being able to ascertain their validity. International law makes clear that the Mexicans are not entitled to property resources in Nigeria, however it has little to say about how property rights are distributed within Nigeria. Property rights within countries are not transparent to outsiders, and it is a stretch to argue that whoever buys goods from those countries knowingly deals in stolen property. There are of course cases where that happens, but the examples these philosophers refer to are not representative of those cases, and can count, at most, as a prima facie argument that the international rules regarding state sovereignty should change.
The ‘de facto’ entitlements in natural resources structured by the principle of sovereign independence do not constitute a property regime, one that defines, assigns and clarifies the legal status of property rights in land and natural resources. They are the consequence of other primary norms of international law, such as non-intervention, sovereign equality and territorial integrity. Leif Wenar is engaged in a sustained effort to offer a viable alternative to default property entitlements supported by existing rules regarding state sovereignty. A property regime that settles conflicting claims over resources and generates rules of ownership is necessary not because the existing property regime fails, but because there is no property regime in natural resources to speak of. 
Even if Western nations are not responsible for buying stolen goods, they could be responsible in a different way. The ‘resource privilege’ and the ‘borrowing privilege’ create perverse incentives in resource rich countries by creating the conditions for coups and increasing the means through which the dictators abuse their citizens. International loans and the trade in resources enable the oppression of the people in developing countries. Making this charge does not depend on clarifying the entitlement in natural resources. For even if the dictators would have legitimate authority in trading them, the western nations are responsible because of the way they participate, along with other agents, in perpetuating harm. 
This line of argument too is on a weak footing. To understand why this is so, it is important to consider the place western nations and institutions occupy in this causal chain. First, in the causal story, western nations and international institutions are implicated, contribute, and perhaps magnify harm. But this does not mean that they are the main cause of the harm. The main agents of harm are the ruthless dictators of developing countries, and the western nations act as enablers. This is so because the dictators of those countries would harm their citizens even if no interaction would take place between them and the western world. That this is a plausible counterfactual is proven by the fact that some of the most oppressive dictators in the former communist countries were tyrannizing their people even at a time when their ties to the western world were substantively severed, which was for most of the duration of the cold war. North Korea still engages in massive abuse of its citizens even while the rest of the world has all but broken contact with it. 
Second, why would we consider countries who buy goods from oppressive regimes as being responsible for the harms committed by that regime? One could reply that they are responsible because western nations could foresee that their actions could result in the kinds of harm that Pogge and Singer emphasize. This adds a further condition for establishing moral responsibility. One is morally responsible for some harm if one is part of a causal chain and one can foresee the harmful effects of one’s action down the causal chain (Sartorio 2007). This further condition is not however enough. The analogy that Michael Walzer offers in his Just and Unjust Wars clarifies this point. 
Walzer discusses the case of an army engaged in a just war which is attacking an enemy in retreat. The retreating army takes over a city by force and conscripts the locals to aid in their war. The besieging army offers the non-combatant inhabitants to ability to exit, however they are prevented by their own army from doing so. In this case, it is the besieged army that bear the burden for the deaths of the inhabitants should they prohibit the inhabitants from exit (Walzer 2006, pp.162–163, 169–170). The same can be said of guerilla warfare, when guerilla fighters force locals to offer shelter or support their activities. If the latter are caught in cross fire, the guerilla fighters bear moral responsibility for the casualties (Walzer 2006). It is those who engage in coercive exploitation, not those who ‘enable’ the harm that are responsible, even if the ‘enablers’ can foresee the results of their actions.
Therefore, if one were able to establish that western nations should be able to foresee that their dealings with corrupt governments would result in oppression and harm, this fact would not be sufficient to establish their moral responsibility. And note further that trade with corrupt governments has complex effects, all of which must be invoked for evaluating trade partners’ moral responsibility. Indeed some argue that trade, investment, and financial support are the only ways to improve the condition of the worst off even if or especially if they live under oppressive regimes, because it is the only way to make some of the benefits of the commercial engagement trickle down to the masses, through access to jobs, goods, education and training and so on. Even if the trickle is small, and the dictators reap most of the benefits, it is better for the poor than no engagement. Because trade has complex effects, the case for ascertaining the moral responsibility of the western nations toward people living in those countries becomes less straightforward. Responsibility could only be established if the main likely effects would be military coups and oppression, but they are not. This is not to say that western nations are not causally involved with the harm committed by repressive regimes. Rather, causal and moral responsibility can come apart, and they do in this case because the position of western nations in the causal chain makes the connection between their actions and likelihood of harm tenuous. 
The methodological point is worth reinforcing here. At its heart, the argument is intended to provide a straight causal story. The rich imposed the global international order that harms the poor (T. W. Pogge 2008, pp.204–209). Therefore, they have responsibility to compensate. However, taken as a whole, it is unclear where to place the western rich in what looks like a complex causal chain. The defenders of the harm argument would like to present a case in which the rich are the main cause, or the most important cause of the harm. Their examples suggest at most that the rich could be somewhere in the causal chain, but they may well be far removed from the genuine site of harm. The fact that they buy property whose status is unclear, or acquiesce in rules that allow corrupt political leaders to borrow in their country’s name, means that corrupt elites and bad local institutions are the active cause of harm. If multiple causes are in play, we need to produce hypotheses about the relative importance of these different causes and to test their relative proximity and contribution to the effects stipulated by the story. 




The widespread poverty still prevalent in the 21st century spotlights questionable patterns of interaction between states, international institutions and the world’s poor. The political philosophers calling attention to these facts are positioned at the forefront of many important debates on global justice. That powerful states have engaged and still engage in egregious patterns of harming the weak is an undisputed historical fact. If we join the debates about how to improve the situation of the globally worst off, we ought to make sure we calibrate our empirical and normative tools to the contours of challenges at hand. I have offered a methodology for evaluating liability for harm and I have applied it to the WTO. Indentifying the agents that cause harm and specifying the ways in which they do so is essential both for holding those agents accountable and for reforming the global order to enhance the protection of fundamental human interests. 




Baran, P.A., 1957. The Political Economy of Growth, Monthly Review Press.Barton, J.H. et al., 2008. The Evolution of the Trade Regime: Politics, Law, and Economics of the GATT and the WTO, Princeton University Press.Beitz, C.R., 2000. Rawls’s Law of Peoples. Ethics, 110(4), pp.669–696.Feinberg, J., 1987. Harm to Others, Oxford University Press, USA.Goldstein, J.L., Rivers, D. & Tomz, M., 2007. Institutions in International Relations: Understanding the Effects of the GATT and the WTO on World Trade. International Organization, 61(01), pp.37–67.Gramsci, A. & Hoare, Q., 1971. Selections from the Prison Notebooks, International Publishers Co.Grieco, J.M., 1988. Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism. International Organization, 42(3), pp.485–507.Lomasky, L.E., 2007. Liberalism Beyond Borders. Social Philosophy and Policy, 24(01), pp.206–233.Mearsheimer, J.J., 1990. Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War. International Security, 15(1), pp.5–56.Mearsheimer, J.J., 2003. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, W. W. Norton & Company.Narlikar, A., 2005. The World Trade Organization: A Very Short Introduction, Oxford University Press, USA.Patten, A., 2005. Should We Stop Thinking about Poverty in Terms of Helping the Poor? Ethics & International Affairs, 19(1), pp.19–27.Pogge, T., 2007. Freedom from Poverty As a Human Right: Who Owes What to the Very Poor? 1st Pub., Oxford University Press, USA.Pogge, T.W., 2004. “Assisting” the Global Poor. In The Ethics of Assistance: Morality and the Distant Needy, Deen K. Chatterjee ed.,. Cambridge University Press, pp. 260–288.Pogge, T.W., 2008. World Poverty and Human Rights 2nd ed., Polity Press.Prebisch, R., 1950. The Economic Development of Latin America: and its Principal Problems.Rawls, J., 2001. The Law of Peoples: with “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited” 1st ed., Harvard University Press.Rex, Warner & Finley, M.I., 1954. History of the Peloponnesian War, Penguin.Risse, M., 2005. How Does the Global Order Harm the Poor? Philosophy and  Public Affairs, 33(4), pp.349–376.Sartorio, C., 2007. Causation and Responsibility. Philosophy Compass, 2(5), pp.749–765.Sen, A., 1988. Poverty and Hunger. Economics and Philosophy, 4, pp.57–68.Singer, P., 1972. Famine, Affluence, and Morality. Philosophy and Public Affairs, 1(3), pp.229–243.Singer, P., 2010. The Life You Can Save: How to Do Your Part to End World Poverty Reprint., Random House Trade Paperbacks.Wallerstein, I., 1979. The Capitalist World-Economy, Cambridge University Press.Waltz, K.N., 2001. Man, the State, and War Revised., Columbia University Press.Walzer, M., 2006. Just And Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument With Historical Illustrations 4th ed., Basic Books.Wenar, L., 2008. Property Rights and the Resource Curse. Philosophy & Public Affairs, 36(1), pp.2–32.WTO, Tariffs: More Bindings and Closer to Zero. Available at: http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm2_e.htm [Accessed October 27, 2010].
Barton, J.H. et al., 2008. The Evolution of the Trade Regime: Politics, Law, and Economics of the GATT and the WTO, Princeton University Press.
Beitz, C.R., 2000. Rawls’s Law of Peoples. Ethics, 110(4), pp.669–696.
Feinberg, J., 1987. Harm to Others, Oxford University Press, USA.
Goldstein, J.L., Rivers, D. & Tomz, M., 2007. Institutions in International Relations: Understanding the Effects of the GATT and the WTO on World Trade. International Organization, 61(01), pp.37–67.
Gramsci, A. & Hoare, Q., 1971. Selections from the Prison Notebooks, International Publishers Co.
Grieco, J.M., 1988. Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism. International Organization, 42(3), pp.485–507.
Lomasky, L.E., 2007. Liberalism Beyond Borders. Social Philosophy and Policy, 24(01), pp.206–233.
Mearsheimer, J.J., 1990. Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War. International Security, 15(1), pp.5–56.
Mearsheimer, J.J., 2003. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, W. W. Norton & Company.
Narlikar, A., 2005. The World Trade Organization: A Very Short Introduction, Oxford University Press, USA.
Patten, A., 2005. Should We Stop Thinking about Poverty in Terms of Helping the Poor? Ethics & International Affairs, 19(1), pp.19–27.
Pogge, T., 2007. Freedom from Poverty As a Human Right: Who Owes What to the Very Poor? 1st Pub., Oxford University Press, USA.
Pogge, T.W., 2004. “Assisting” the Global Poor. In The Ethics of Assistance: Morality and the Distant Needy, Deen K. Chatterjee ed.,. Cambridge University Press, pp. 260–288.
Pogge, T.W., 2008. World Poverty and Human Rights 2nd ed., Polity Press.
Prebisch, R., 1950. The Economic Development of Latin America: and its Principal Problems.
Rawls, J., 2001. The Law of Peoples: with “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited” 1st ed., Harvard University Press.
Rex, Warner & Finley, M.I., 1954. History of the Peloponnesian War, Penguin.
Risse, M., 2005. How Does the Global Order Harm the Poor? Philosophy and  Public Affairs, 33(4), pp.349–376.
Sartorio, C., 2007. Causation and Responsibility. Philosophy Compass, 2(5), pp.749–765.
Sen, A., 1988. Poverty and Hunger. Economics and Philosophy, 4, pp.57–68.
Singer, P., 1972. Famine, Affluence, and Morality. Philosophy and Public Affairs, 1(3), pp.229–243.
Singer, P., 2010. The Life You Can Save: How to Do Your Part to End World Poverty Reprint., Random House Trade Paperbacks.
Wallerstein, I., 1979. The Capitalist World-Economy, Cambridge University Press.
Waltz, K.N., 2001. Man, the State, and War Revised., Columbia University Press.
Walzer, M., 2006. Just And Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument With Historical Illustrations 4th ed., Basic Books.
Wenar, L., 2008. Property Rights and the Resource Curse. Philosophy & Public Affairs, 36(1), pp.2–32.













^1	  I am using, following the convention in the literature, the terms Western, developed, and rich interchangeably to refer to affluent nations, with the caveat that the terms are approximate (Japan is developed and yet is it not Western).
^2	  For realists this is a descriptive statement about the dynamic of international relations, not a normative judgment about the appropriateness of the power relations within international institutions  (Waltz 2001; Grieco 1988; Mearsheimer 1990).
^3	  This insight from Thucydides is central the realist worldview. 
^4	  Pogge says ‘[O]ne might argue that the distinction between actively causing poverty and failing to prevent it has little or no moral importance. Allowing hunger to kill people whom one could easily save, even mere foreigners, is morally on a par with killing them, or at any rate little better. But I agree on this point […] that the distinction between actively causing poverty and merely failing to prevent it is morally significant in regard to both conduct and institutional design’ (T. W. Pogge 2008, pp.15, 136).
^5	  This point holds even if you think, as Lomasky does, that the state violates the rights of its citizens by restricting or denying them opportunities to trade with outsiders. This claim is consistent with saying that the rights of outsiders have not been violated because they do not have a right that specific others trade with them.
^6	  One does not need to understand a right not be hungry as a claim right, and Amartya Sen has a rather unique understanding of such a right when he says that its function is not to determine what people are due here and now, but rather to act as “a moral claim as to what should be valued, and what institutional structure we should aim for, and try to guarantee if feasible.” For Sen (1988), a right not to be hungry is a justification to review existing institutional structures and policies.
